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Abstract
This essay examines James Baldwin’s conception of what he calls 
“black English” and its link to historical and cultural identity. I link 
Baldwin’s defense of black English to his reflections on the sor-
row songs and sound, which draws on long-standing accounts of 
musicality as the foundation of the African-American tradition. 
In order to demonstrate this relation to the tradition, the essay 
puts Baldwin’s remarks in relation to Frederick Douglass’s and 
W. E. B. Du Bois’s description of the sorrow songs. I also under-
score how that relation to the African-American tradition marks 
an important set of tensions with mid-twentieth century black 
Atlantic theory (Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon), tensions which 
make sense of the Americanness of Baldwin’s work. Across the 
essay, I claim that Baldwin’s account of language has epistemo-
logical and ontological significance (and so is not just aesthetic or 
political), which gives an interesting and important twist to Martin 
Heidegger’s famous phrase that “language is the house of Being.”
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Writers are obliged, at some point, to realize that they are 
involved in a language which they must change. And for a 
black writer in this country to be born into the English lan-
guage is to realize that the assumptions on which the language 
operates are his enemy.
—baldwin, “On Language, Race, and the Black Writer”
James Baldwin’s two essays from 1979 on what he calls black English 
bring two and a half decades of reflection on African-American history and 
memory to bear on the question of language, identity, and cultural mean-
ing. Baldwin understands that the question of language is no small matter, 
and cannot in any way be reduced to style or mere aesthetics. Rather, on 
Baldwin’s account, language makes, remakes, and reproduces a world. So, 
when the legitimacy of African-American English is contested, an entire 
sense of knowing and being is at stake. Baldwin therefore takes on the 
question of language in urgent and provocative terms. What does it mean 
to speak? What is the relation of language to senses of home, belonging, 
dissent, and resistance? What does it mean to inhabit a language that has 
from the beginning been an instrument of the enemy, wielded in the service 
of oppression, but also transformed by and recalibrated for the oppressed? 
And what can be said when the speaking and inhabitation of a transformed 
English is contested on racialized terms?
Both of Baldwin’s essays from 1979 are angry, defensive, and, in many 
ways, improvised pieces of outrage and emphatic argumentation. And 
rightly so. “If Black English Isn’t a Language, Then Tell Me, What Is?” and 
“Black English: A Dishonest Argument” both speak against the racial hege-
mony at work in the disparaging of vernacular speech—and, as we shall 
see, vernacular cultural forms more widely. That wider sense of vernacular 
cultural form will prove crucial in the following reflections. The origins of 
black English, which Baldwin identifies as memory of and witness to the 
auction block, link vernacular speech to familiar and complex stories of 
African-American culture and identity: the spirituals, the central role of 
musicality, and forms of resistance and saying yes to life that animate the 
sounds of identity formation. If, as Baldwin puts it, the sound of the choir 
can tell the story of the auction block, and that story is borne further in and 
by vernacular speech, then wider questions of identity, place, and home 
intertwine with history and memory to form a sense of belonging even 
under conditions of radical persecution and terror.
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In this moment, Baldwin is brought back, in the mode of critic, to 
many of the issues at play in (or even haunting) the colonial world in post–
World War II anticolonial thought concerned with speech, writing, and 
racial authenticity. Like the well-known manifestos from Aimé Césaire, 
Léopold Senghor, and others in the postwar period, Baldwin’s essays on 
African-American vernacular, written two and a half decades after the 
Bandung and Paris conferences in which the francophone manifestos were 
initially forged, read with the same sense of moral defense and uncompro-
mising, if at times excessively demanding, love for Black people. Indeed, 
Baldwin’s nonfiction always asks the most difficult questions about race 
and self, interrogating everything from rage to love, questioning the dis-
tinction between the two, and imagining in every instance how the history 
and memory of African-American life is to be theorized, defended, and 
moved to the center of cultural identity formation. Baldwin’s work on lan-
guage is certainly at the center of wide questions of race and self; he makes 
it clear, in incisive, enraged rhetoric, that the dismissal or denigration of 
African-American speech is nothing other than white racism concerned 
with severing Black people, for a second time, from historical and memo-
rial roots. As with all roots and appeals to rootedness, self-knowledge is at 
stake. That occasion of rage, as with so many other occasions in Baldwin’s 
nonfiction, is also a moment of deeper theoretical reflection on the nature 
of race, identity, memory, and history. And that reflection sets out some 
distance between him and other mid-century (and later) black Atlantic theo-
rist, especially, as we shall see, around questions of home.
In a particularly existentialist register, typical of even his earliest 
nonfiction, Baldwin’s work on language evokes something very much 
like Martin Heidegger’s famous turn of phrase “language is the house 
of Being.”1 This is of course not to say that Baldwin had anything like 
Heidegger’s metaphysical or ontological ambition in theorizing the rela-
tion of language to Being. Rather, Baldwin’s rhetorical intensity around 
the question of vernacular speech is located in a smaller and more local-
ized, yet also just as enormous and transhistorical, problem: how is a 
sense of home, that sense of belonging and being in a place and culture, 
possible inside of a multi-century history of unrepresentable violence? 
How does language remember what we might otherwise forget? We are 
always inside that history, for Baldwin, even as the interior constraints of 
history are shown in his fiction and nonfiction to be partial and fractured 
(Baldwin’s protagonists are never in full possession of themselves, and 
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his nonfiction if remarkable for its exploratory character). Constraints 
are fractured because vernacular speech and culture produce and repro-
duce, for African-Americans, a sense of home that is simultaneously 
inside and outside violence. How, then, might we conceive vernacular 
speech and vernacular cultural forms as speaking to, as, and from sites of 
not just resistance and survival, but also of world making and being that 
sustain life in—and then after—the wreckage of History? That is, how 
could we see in Baldwin’s work on language a theory of memory and 
history akin to what Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic2 famously named 
counter-modernity, an alternative story in which pain and pleasure, every-
dayness and sublimity, aggression and equanimity, and all of those vicis-
situdes of speaking life into being are heard and felt in so-called “black 
English”?
Part of the story of Baldwin’s account of vernacular speech and 
how it speaks life into being draws on a key cluster of concepts in the 
African-American intellectual tradition: sound, memory, and the spiritu-
als. I want to begin here by drawing on two signature moments from 
that tradition in Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. Du Bois in order to 
deepen the historical sense of Baldwin’s claims. His claims do not come 
from nowhere. Baldwin’s thinking is innovative in that peculiar interval 
produced by his engaged repetition of the past that wants, in repetition, 
to say something new; one can recall here how the Biblical evocation of 
“the fire next time” becomes, across a critique of religion and religiosity, 
a way of linking the persistence of rage to a vision of love that is at once 
radically secular in its politics and preacherly spiritual in its prophecy 
and existential meaning.3 Repetition, interval, the new. A similar story 
is told in Baldwin’s theorizing vernacular speech and cultural forms. In 
that theorizing, Baldwin draws on the irreducibly conflicted relationship 
between whiteness as standard and black English as a counter-speech, 
but, as is typical of his unexpected reversals of thinking, such conflict 
leads Baldwin not to a sense of alienation, but instead to the “paradox: 
blacks, Indians, Chicanos, Asians, and that beleaguered handful of white 
people who understand their history are the only people who know who 
they are.”4 To understand African-American history is to understand the 
sound of tradition, something that begins in the past and, in its haunting 
of the present, animates the realities and possibilities of Black life. And 
so we begin with what must be repeated in order to return to an account 
of self-knowledge.
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Memory Sound
The Spirituals are really the most characteristic product of the 
race genius as yet in America. But the very elements which 
make them uniquely expressive of the Negro make them at 
the same time deeply representative of the soil that produced 
them. Thus, as unique spiritual products of American life, they 
become nationally as well as racially characteristic.
—alain locke, “The Negro Spirituals”5
The function of the spirituals in the African-American intellectual tradition 
is familiar and has a long history of elaboration, with particularly important 
moments in the cultural history work of W. E. B. Du Bois and Alain Locke. 
For both, the spirituals are the foundation of the tradition. Emerging from 
sites of mourning, resistance, and pleasure, the spirituals make think-
ing possible under conditions of impossibility, and so begin the African-
American tradition from a rooted, complex space of being and becoming. 
And yet the spirituals are altogether enigmatic, complex, and, while the 
origin of tradition, elliptical in their own speaking to origins. The content of 
the spirituals is comprised of both lyric and sound; the distinction between 
those two forms of expression is thin, at best, and probably best expressed 
as inextricably bound and interdependent.
The spirituals also play an important role in Baldwin’s conception 
of language. Black English, for Baldwin, is a composite of history and 
being. Black English reckons with racial history in vernacular form—it is a 
sound with history and memory inside it—and is an expression of having-
come-to-self-knowledge. His elaboration of the origins of black English in 
slavery and its aftermath—survival and protection—therefore shows the 
interconnection between history as cruelty and language as identity for-
mation, but always without casting that language and identity formation 
as pathological. Rather, the insistence on the “sheer intelligence” of black 
English, a phrase he borrows in the black English essay from Toni Morrison, 
underscores the seriousness of vernacular expression both for the meaning 
of existence—the world-making force of language—and for cultural forma-
tion in the Americas generally, the United States in particular.
Let me take two examples to prepare the ground for understanding 
Baldwin’s appropriation of the spirituals in conceiving black English as a 
vernacular of world-making. Consider, for example, how the sound of slaves 
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singing impacted Frederick Douglass. Amidst the sharp rhetoric and horri-
fying stories of plantation violence in the opening two chapters, Douglass’s 
Narrative is interrupted by a strange and compelling pause in the second 
chapter. The second half of the second chapter interrupts his depiction of 
slave life with haunting descriptions of slave songs heard across a plan-
tation field. The dramatic context of this interruption is remarkable; the 
entire tone of Narrative changes, just for a few pages, shifting from the 
righteous outrage of depictions of slave-owner violence to a sense of won-
der and melancholy at the sound of slave songs sung in the field. Douglass 
recounts how slaves returning from work,
while on their way, they would make the dense old woods, for miles 
around, reverberate with their wild songs, revealing at once the high-
est joy and the deepest sadness. They would compose and sing as they 
went along, consulting neither time nor tune. The thought that came 
up, came out—if not in the word, in the sound;—and as frequently in 
the one as in the other. They would sometimes sing the most pathetic 
sentiment in the most rapturous tone, and the most rapturous senti-
ment in the most pathetic tone.6
The chapter and a half before this and the following paragraphs through 
the remainder of the text are noteworthy for their adherence to linearity 
and clear lessons. Douglass’s sufferings at each point of the autobiography 
deepen the pain of slavery, each moment of witness gives depth to rage 
and despair. Narrative leaves no doubt that it is an abolitionist text con-
cerned with communication of the particular violence of plantation life and 
articulation of the conditions of liberation through violent resistance. The 
confrontation with Covey, which shifts the arc of the story from suffering 
toward an emerging freedom, is followed by glimpses of light and increas-
ingly open horizons, all of which culminate in Douglass’s freedom from 
both the literal bonds of slavery and the decimation of subjectivity made 
through its violence. The singing of the slaves, however, changes every-
thing in terms of tone and orientation. Space and time break with linear 
models and the aesthetic sensibility of the song and singer is confounded 
and confounding. Douglass is moved by the song, especially the sound, but 
cannot, for once, make sense of what he sees and hears. This is a singular 
moment in the text. That is, for all the astonishment in Douglass’s prose 
about slavery’s violence, for all the clear moralism and outrage one expects 
CPR 3.2_03_Drabinski.indd   208 01/07/15   10:10 PM
This content downloaded from 
             148.85.223.16 on Fri, 17 May 2019 00:44:35 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
209  ■  john e. drabinski 
from an abolitionist text, the songs of the slaves open up, if only for one 
moment, a massively different horizon in Narrative. He instrumentalizes 
the songs in a brief remark, noting “I have sometimes thought that the 
mere hearing of those songs would do more to impress some minds with 
the horrible character of slavery, than the reading of whole volumes of phi-
losophy on the subject could do.”7 But his instrumentalization is an inter-
ruption only of a longer pause in the swirl of pain, suffering, and hope the 
songs bring to word and sound.
What are we to make of this moment? To be sure, unlike the first 
 witness to slave master violence—the beating of his aunt, which initiates 
him into slave subjectivity—or the fight with Covey—the moment of psy-
chic liberation—the songs of the slaves confound Douglass’s own vision of 
himself and the cruel institution of slavery. The slaves sing without didacti-
cism; there is no lesson to be drawn from the words or the communicative 
action of collective singing. In fact, the slaves sing from and to a lesson-less 
place. Without a didactic moment, Douglass is left only with the impossible 
mixture of despair and hope, pathos and rapture, sadness and joy. Even the 
sound itself does not make sense; Douglass describes the music as disobe-
dient to time and tune, although the strangeness of the sound does not 
inhibit or limit the power of sound. Indeed, the distortion of rules and the 
abdication of moral lesson and instruction can be said to imbue the songs 
with their own special power—a power that transcends the uncomplicated 
moral arc of Narrative. The transcendence of moral arc thereby opens up 
another dimension of slavery—a non-instrumentalizable dimension, to be 
sure—that is otherwise absent from Douglass’s account of the plantation. 
And, further, what this brings into view is how Narrative largely eschews 
the melancholy of slavery, the meaning of the sound of the slaves’ song, 
in favor of the outrage and wound of violence. What that violence leaves 
behind, the memory of pain and unredeemed suffering, does not appear 
in the text except in the slave songs overheard in the field. Douglass’s lack 
of clear vision and description when recounting the songs, his absorption 
in the strange spectacle of it all, is, in its own way, an authentic mode of 
describing the melancholic site. Melancholia can only interrupt a didactic 
narrative. And so the slave songs interrupt Douglass’s autobiography with 
the very theme of Narrative itself: the memory of slavery’s pain and suf-
fering. Without lesson and without resolution, the songs stall Douglass’s 
 dialectic and posit what is, for Narrative, the text’s outside and unassimi-
lable enigma.
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In the closing chapter of The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois echoes 
Douglass’s encounter with the peculiarity and intractability of memory in 
the sorrow songs. Like Douglass, Du Bois’s account of hearing memory-
music, of his discerning the sorrow in the so-called sorrow songs, is ani-
mated by a kind of wonder. It is a wonder that draws the listener in, to 
be sure. That is the character of wonder-as-affect. But it is also a wonder 
that marks a difference between the memory carried by the song and the 
capacity of the listener to comprehend the meaning of that memory. In 
other words, it is a wonder begun in the trauma of slavery. Sorrow is unas-
similable to the narrative of uplift that threads the various chapters of Souls 
together. And yet that wonder, that memory whose pain draws the reader 
and listener back from the looping story of freedom, is inseparable from 
the meaning of the place in which the sorrow songs were gestated, then 
born. Du Bois writes:
The Music of Negro religion is that plaintive rhythmic melody, with its 
touching minor cadences, which, despite caricature and defilement, 
still remains the most original and beautiful expression of human life 
and longing yet born on American soil. Sprung from the African for-
ests, where its counterpart can still be heard, it was adapted, changed, 
and intensified by the tragic soul-life of the slave, until, under the 
stress of law and whip, it became the one true expression of a people’s 
sorrow, despair, and hope.8
Thus, Du Bois claims, and this is no small intervention in the question of 
home and place, that the Americanness of the sorrow songs comes from 
their embeddedness in a particular history and memory. The songs make 
place and home through the soul-life of the slave—a kind of founding 
ghost, perhaps, and certainly a kind of identity out of shared historical 
memory. They begin as the Americas begin: pain, suffering, exile without 
promise of return, and the endless trials of what Du Bois called the color-
line, the veil, and double-consciousness. The sorrow songs are a gift, but 
not one that edifies or even makes sense. Indeed, part of Du Bois’s com-
mentary on the songs in chapters 10 and 14 of Souls consists of a certain 
astonishment at the sound of the music, a sound we might identify with 
memory and its unfathomable character. Du Bois’s reflections on the sor-
row songs always come back to this astonishment and wonder, and how 
sound makes memory’s ineffable character present in sound, even as the 
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sound of suffering’s memorial asks us (or induces the question in us): what 
do the songs mean? How has sound become so melancholy, yet crucial 
for the meaning of  present and future? Begun in slavery, the melancholic 
sound is the sound of the other founding father, the “father” who passes 
along sadness and hope at one and the same time. In that sense, Du Bois 
argues, the slave experience is in the song. Du Bois writes: “What are these 
songs, and what do they mean? . . . I know that these songs are the articu-
late message of the slave to the world. . . . They are the music of unhappy 
people, of the children of disappointment; they tell of death and suffer-
ing and unvoiced longing toward a truer world, of misty wanderings and 
 hidden ways.”9
The temporality of this passage is key. All of the affects and conditions 
of subjectivity described in this and other passages on the sorrow songs 
trail off into the past. In that sense, the song is a clue. The song directs 
the listener to the trail of the past, draws the one who hears the message 
and memorial into the moment, but then withdraws into the sorrowful 
memory it bears. That memory is elliptical. We are never brought to the 
experience of slavery itself, but only the melancholy of its wake.
The crucial element of the sorrow song as memory song is sound. 
And it is sound that provokes Du Bois’s deepest anxiety about the future of 
memory. Sound, in Souls, is linked to authenticity in ways that are insepara-
ble from the capacity of the song to carry memory of pain, suffering, long-
ing, and hope; the sorrow songs are the slave’s message to the world, and 
that message is ever precarious. Du Bois will therefore constantly remind 
us of the threat of caricature, defilement, and imitation. If the songs lose 
the purity of sound, the songs lose the sanctity of memory. Authenticity is 
therefore not only a question of performance and the aesthetics of recep-
tion (though it is certainly that), but also, and perhaps firstly, a question of 
preservation of founding wounds and their strange gift of life to the future. 
Du Bois writes:
Since their day they have been imitated—sometimes well, by the 
 singers of Hampton and Atlanta, sometimes ill, by straggling 
 quartettes. Caricature has sought again to spoil the quaint beauty of 
the music, and has filled the air with many debased melodies which 
vulgar ears scarce know from the real. But the true Negro folk-song 
still lives in the hearts of those who have heard them truly sung and in the 
hearts of the Negro people.10
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Every iteration of the sorrow songs traffics in imitation, so the critical issue 
is how imitation is able to summon and evoke the ghostly past. That is, Du 
Bois’s question is how we can discern the haunted aesthetic of the Hampton 
and Atlanta University singers and, in that discernment, understand both 
the potential of authentic performance to call forth memory and the poten-
tial of caricature to pervert memory, identity, and the sanctity of both. Du 
Bois therefore marks an important distinction here between authenticity 
and mass-produced, mass-consumable musical expression. Caricature 
appeals to vulgar ears. But the authenticity of the sorrow songs is ensured 
in part by the performance, in the main by the listener: the Negro people. 
This is a key moment in Souls, for it tells the story of memory and history 
and sound without naïveté about the modern world. Mass production and 
mass consumption transform the aesthetic character of any given object—
the mass of mass consumption requires the leveling of cultural production. 
Du Bois worries about the future of memory in this moment, and yet that 
concern is eased through an appeal to his notion of race and racial identity. 
The common spiritual striving of black people, which ranges in his early 
work from essentialist claims about blood to the promise of shared history 
and culture, ensures that the song will be heard and that the sound will carry 
somewhere. Transmission of pain and memory, then, has a future, even 
as caricature and vulgar ears remind us that every cultural production is 
exposed to mass production and its perversions.
What are we to make of Douglass’s and Du Bois’s encounter with the 
music of slavery? For both, it is a moment of profound disturbance. The songs 
in both Narrative and Souls interrupt stories of resistance and liberation with 
memory, trauma, and its ghosts. This disturbance then evokes a kind of devo-
tion—for Douglass, the memory of the moment stands as a sacred space of 
pain that exceeds the abolitionist program of the text, and, for Du Bois, it situ-
ates black subjectivity in the strange, haunting interval between the painful 
past and the future of the color line. Douglass and Du Bois tell compassionate 
ghost stories: concerned about the ghost, worried that the ghost will wander 
rather than be summoned and loved, but also wary of any attempt to inscribe 
the ghost into logics of comprehension and description. The songs come to 
Douglass and Du Bois, and their appearance in the text is always marked by a 
kind of astonishment at the ineffability, yet affective communicability, of what 
is brought to presence in sound. In that sense, we can call the presence of the 
sorrow songs in both texts as moments of the sublime. The sublime has a 
specific history in Western philosophy, of course, and it is often used to mark 
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the limits of the intellect. G-d, nature, infinity, perhaps even the soul—these 
moments of the sublime underscore human finitude by noting, through the 
boldness of the examples, the limits of knowledge. The excess of pain and 
memory in the sorrow songs, however, does not dazzle or astonish in that 
same  manner. Rather, the intensity of the slave experience, as Douglass and 
Du Bois both argue, astonishes with the unthinkable and unsayable of centu-
ries of cruelty and suffering without pause. That is, rather than astonishing us 
with the power of what exceeds human finitude and thinking as a kind of exal-
tation, the sublimity of the sorrow song evacuates the world of meaning and 
redemption, leaving the sadness of memory of suffering in sound and word. 
And yet that evacuation is itself the condition of being and another kind of 
future. A strange double, yes, but such doubling is sustained by the sublime’s 
power to disrupt and reorient according to its own logic. Human finitude is 
marked, underscored, and moved to the center of the world in order to make 
another order possible or thinkable, even in its unthinkability. The irrevoca-
ble paradox of the sorrow songs—the sadness that is joyful, the hope that is 
impossible—makes the Americas possible. Memory of possibility is sound 
itself. Sublimity thereby marks the intensity of the founding of vernacularity, 
the unspeakable and unimaginable made into speech and form and thought. 
Language.
Let me shift now to Baldwin’s intervention. Baldwin’s conception 
of language draws precisely on this location of memory inside sound, 
writing Douglass’s and Du Bois’s accounts of sound into the medium 
of  vernacular expression. In the short essay “Of the Sorrow Songs: The 
Cross of Redemption,” Baldwin evokes the spirit of Douglass, Du Bois, 
and Locke, adding important depth to his understanding of language. He 
recalls and claims the genealogy of black English, forged on the auction 
block, and then links language to musicality and music’s ability to trans-
form the meaning of time. It is this temporal transformation that means 
everything. If time can mean something other than the transmission of 
abjection and pathology—something with which Frantz Fanon struggled 
mightily—then perhaps memory of the past, borne as it is by vernacular 
language and expressive culture, is a ghost that can be welcomed, rather 
than fled. A friend, rather than an enemy of the future. Baldwin writes in 
“Of the Sorrow Songs”:
It is out of this, and much more than this, that black American music 
springs. This music begins on the auction block.
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Now, whoever is unable to face this—the auction block; whoever 
cannot see that that auction block is the demolition, by Europe, of 
all human standards: a demolition accomplished, furthermore, at 
that hour of the world’s history, in the name of ‘civilization’; whoever 
pretends that the slave mother does not weep, until this hour, for 
her slaughtered son, that the son does not weep for his slaughtered 
father; or whoever pretends that the white father did not, literally, and 
knowing what he was doing, hand, and burn, and castrate, his black 
son—whoever cannot face this can never pay the price for the ‘beat’ 
which is key to music, and the key to life.
Music is our witness, and our ally. The ‘beat’ is the confession 
which recognizes, changes, and conquers time.
Then, history becomes a garment we can wear, and share, and 
not a cloak in which to hide; and time becomes a friend.11
Musicality is critical for both functions of vernacular. In turning to the 
particularity of the spirituals for theorizing musicality, sound, and cul-
ture, Baldwin marks his approach to language as distinctively African-
American—gaining that small bit of distance from visions of African 
diasporic unity and generalized racial identity. That is, as we will see later, 
the conquest of time, which makes time a friend, speaks to the particularly 
African-American ghost as it is carried by the sound and form of speak-
ing and expression. While one could argue that this relation to a ghost in 
sound is characteristic of orality in multiple traditions across the black 
Americas, Baldwin’s claim is not concerned with a shared morphology or 
“aural syntax,” as it were, but instead with how the specifically African-
American experience of the auction block, folded into the black church and 
the spirituals, founds an expressive medium that marks this place with this 
memory and this culture. With that specificity, Baldwin is able to articulate a 
kind of counter-nationalism—a sense of home, really—that works against 
the pan-African current of the time in black Atlantic theory, as well as, more 
locally for Baldwin, against the cultural nationalism of the Nation of Islam 
and related movements. Fanon’s claim that to speak a language means 
inhabiting a whole world then comes back to Baldwin, but retooled with 
an affirmation of—rather than distance from—vernacular cultural forms. 
This affirmation, which makes for an intense defense and elaboration of 
black English in all its aspects, sees the truth in Fanon’s claim that lan-
guage has a history and that such history determines how identity is made 
CPR 3.2_03_Drabinski.indd   214 01/07/15   10:10 PM
This content downloaded from 
             148.85.223.16 on Fri, 17 May 2019 00:44:35 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
215  ■  john e. drabinski 
(or unmade) in acts of expression (personal, interpersonal, and cultural), 
and yet, because Baldwin does not see abjection in the history carried by 
vernacular forms, Fanon’s insight is able to work as a productive account 
of black culture, and so not just critique and testimony to alienation. The 
spirituals are history and memory in sound and word. That specific history 
and memory make a certain language. And that language makes a certain 
sense of home, not only “no matter or despite the brutality and pain,” but 
also because “sheer intelligence” emerges from brutality and pain. This is 
the ghost in language that, for Baldwin, makes saying yes to life possible.
Vernacular Sounds
In “Letter on Humanism,” a letter written to French theorist Jean Beaufret 
in response to the claim that his book Being and Time did not contain an 
 ethics, Heidegger famously remarks that “language is the house of Being.”12 
This is a signature moment in Heidegger’s work, one that (roughly) shifts 
his work from the relationship between subjectivity and ontology to the 
more searching, and certainly more peculiar, question of the intertwining 
of language, truth, and Being. This is without a doubt a very mid-century 
European problem. But Heidegger also underscores something very impor-
tant that travels well across national and racial geographies: language and 
what it means to be are inextricably linked.
For Heidegger, the question of language and Being begins a long 
story about the special relationship between German and ancient Greek, 
the special character of the Greek language and its ability to reveal cer-
tain things about the world, the special capacity of German to reactivate so 
much of that specialness of ancient Greek, and so also a long story about 
the special depth of German nationalism. A philosophical nationalism, of 
course, but nationalism nonetheless. So much specialness. If we de-specify 
Heidegger’s remark for a moment—bracketing the particularities of his 
own work on language and Being—then we can catch sight of a crucial 
insight that also lies at the heart of the black Atlantic with a decisive colonial 
twist: being is inconceivable outside how speaking, writing, and expression 
manifest. The question of how is pointed and crucial, for in the question of 
the capacity of language to be tweaked, transformed, or wholly overturned 
lies the question of the possibility of liberation. The effect of colonialism, 
for the colonizer, is to simultaneously maintain the link between language 
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and home and de-link—in the production of alienation at the level of the 
psyche, of knowing and being—colonized subjects from language, and 
therefore from any sense of home.
This is of course the question that drove so much of the Négritude 
movement and its obsessive rewriting of the French language in Césaire’s 
and Senghor’s poetry. Rewriting as the question of being and language—
this is the existential moment for Négritude poets. The meaning of exis-
tence and liberation from the alienating effects of colonization is a cultural 
project, turning on a transformation of the colonizer’s language. Making 
French black liberates black colonial subjects. Fanon underscores this same 
claim in his own particular existentialist context when, in Black Skin, White 
Masks, he makes two key remarks on language. First, in the opening pas-
sage of the book:
To speak means being able to use a certain syntax and possessing 
the morphology of such and such a language, but it means above all 
assuming a culture and bearing the weight of a civilization.13
And then, further in the opening chapter:
To speak a language is to appropriate its world and culture. The 
Antillean who wants to be white will succeed, since he will have 
adopted the cultural tool of language.14
Language, Fanon here claims, carries culture and civilization—a world—
in word and syntax. The world carried is anti-Black. The house of Being in 
Heidegger becomes, in the black Atlantic context, the house of the coloniza-
tion of the human, of being, and therefore of Being. To speak is to be inscribed 
in a language whose history and roots set the terms of alienation or home. 
Anti-Black racism, for Fanon and others in mid-century black Atlantic theory, 
makes the very act of speaking a moment of subjugation and absolute loss. 
For all of the difference between them, the early Fanon and Négritude think-
ers share this fundamental claim about language and alienation from the very 
possibility of being: roots are set in what cannot be home for the colonized, 
and, in turn, makes a home for the colonizer in the language of subjugating. 
Everyone is implicated in the act of speaking the language of subjugation.
For all of his attempts to differentiate himself and African-American 
cultural life from mid-century diasporic thought, especially in “Princes 
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and Powers,”15 Baldwin nonetheless makes a similar sort of claim when 
he begins a defense of black English. He writes in “If Black English Isn’t a 
Language, Then Tell Me What It Is?” that
language, incontestably, reveals the speaker. Language, also, far more 
dubiously, is meant to define the other—and, in this case, the other 
is refusing to be defined by a language that has never been able to 
recognize him.16
This passage recalls Fanon’s long reflection on the problem of diction in 
Black Skin, White Masks, a reflection that circles around the terrifying claim 
that the destiny of the black person is to be white, confronting the impos-
sibility of the actualization of blackness in standard French. Fanon never 
quite responds to this dilemma in terms of language; pidgin and creole, the 
two vernacular moments in the Caribbean context, are derided as racialized 
performances for white people. Black Skin, White Masks opens with quali-
fied praise for Césaire’s Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, but never 
quite affirms or articulates an approach to language as liberation strategy, 
instead leaving his work on language in the between-space of pessimistic 
diagnosis and the optimism of a new humanism.
This impasse is no small matter given the role of language as, in a 
black Atlantic sense, the house of the being. Baldwin’s advance on Fanon, 
and I do think it is a profoundly important one, is to see in the evolution of 
vernacular(s) a resistance to alienation and the construction of a medium 
in which the oppressed can see and know themselves. If language is how 
we inhabit a world, then what would it mean for vernacular expression 
to be a whole world unto itself? And, therefore, to perhaps be a home? 
Baldwin writes:
People evolve a language in order to describe and thus control their 
circumstances or in order to not be submerged by a situation that 
they cannot articulate. (And if they cannot articulate it, they are 
submerged.)17
Without language, being is submersion. In this case, submersion drowns 
being in the wave of anti-black racism, where whiteness occupies black 
being from the inside and outside—the effect of standardized word, syn-
tax, and diction documented in Fanon’s early work. But language evolves, 
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Baldwin notes, in order to resist this submersion. Black vernacular—the 
pidgin and creole Fanon so casually derides—articulates. Articulates sur-
vival, yes, but it also articulates what comes after survival: the formation 
of identity and culture. What does this evolution look like? A long passage 
from “If Black English Isn’t a Language, Then Tell Me What It Is?” is worth 
quoting in full:
Black English is the creation of the black diaspora. Blacks came to 
the United States chained to each other, but from different tribes. 
Neither could speak the other’s language. If two black people, at that 
bitter hour of the world’s history, had been able to speak to each other, 
the institution of chattel slavery could never have lasted as long as it 
did. Subsequently, the slave was given, under the eye, and the gun 
of his master, Congo Square, and the Bible—or, in other words, and 
under those conditions, the slave began the formation of the black 
church, and it is within this unprecedented tabernacle that black 
English began to be formed. This was not, merely, as in the European 
example, the adoption of a foreign tongue, but an alchemy that trans-
formed ancient elements into a new language: A language comes into 
existence by means of brutal necessity, and the rules of language are dic-
tated by what the language must convey.18
This passage raises a number of questions, including the relationship 
between sound, memory, and the spirituals—something that, as we have 
already seen, links Baldwin’s work on language to the foundations of the 
African-American intellectual tradition. Let me postpone that matter for a 
moment and first pose the existential question Baldwin raises here. Being 
itself is made possible in the moment of brutal necessity, a necessity that 
is and is made possible by the refusal of nothingness and the abyss of sub-
mersion. The moment of brutal necessity is terrifying and repeated for two 
and a half centuries, so the question of vernacular raises the very real prob-
lem of the relationship between painful origin and the culture that is made 
out of that origin. For Fanon, the painful origin is too much, a ghost that 
drags down the present with the terrifying past; survival, for him, meant 
producing relationships to language—pidgin and creole, then folded over 
into cultural forms like blues, jazz, and spirituals—that degraded black 
people. But Baldwin, borrowing Toni Morrison’s turn of phrase, instead 
calls vernacular language a whole world (and not a “dialect,” which would 
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subordinate black English to white English), one marked by “this sheer 
intelligence.” An intelligence—that is, a way of thinking, expressing, and 
making a world. Or making a series of worlds, diverse from the beginning, 
in the world of black English and the various histories and memories of 
which it is composed. To inhabit the word, syntax, and sound of this English 
is to be more than Fanon’s alienated subject.
The cultural question raised by the Négritude movement takes on 
an interesting twist here. Whereas for Césaire and Senghor it was a world-
to-come, and thus a question of the future as such, for Baldwin it is a ques-
tion of simply theorizing what is already there, not as the remainder, but as 
the fully realized production of history and memory. That is, Baldwin takes 
the vernacular example on its own terms, neither projecting it into a distant 
future nor framing it with the abjection of black diasporic history. This 
is absolutely crucial, for it pushes back against so much of black Atlantic 
theory in the middle of the twentieth century that turned on an interpreta-
tion of the past as abject and which, in turn, rendered the cultural inheri-
tance of that past abject as well. Fanon’s remark that blues and jazz were 
produce for the pleasure of the white gaze (“offered up for the admiration 
of the oppressors”19), and so not out of a sense of resistance and survival, 
neatly embodies this abjection of history. Baldwin’s turn to the vernacular 
as such, his encounter with and appreciation of black English on its own 
terms as expressive of a sense of home, outside the hegemony of white 
America’s sense of belonging, locates the crucial concept of creation in 
the past and documents its presence in the present. Pace Négritude, then, 
the colonizing language—the language of the enemy—does not stand in 
need of change because it has already been changed. In that having-been-
changed, there is a sense of a house of blackness, so to speak, as knowing 
and being. A whole world, not to someday inhabit, but one that is already 
inhabited. So, in “Black English: A Dishonest Argument,” Baldwin writes 
plainly:
The black American has no antecedent. We, in this country, on this 
continent, in the most despairing terms, created an identity which 
had never been seen before in the history of the world. We created 
that music.20
Music, language, identity. Or, in a word: being. Being, perhaps, as direct 
description, but a description that requires a certain eye and ear. The sort 
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of description that attends to the doubled structure of a vernacular born of 
survival, resistance, and pleasure. This turn to creation, evoking the need to 
break out of, while also being ensnared in, the assumptions of an enemy’s 
language, marks Baldwin’s departure from dominant cultural nationalist 
currents of mid-century black Atlantic theory, and it also recalls the open-
ing lines of one of his early essays collected in Notes of a Native Son. “It is 
only in his music,” Baldwin notes in “Many Thousands Gone,” “that the 
Negro in America has been able to tell his story,” but he qualifies this with 
the subordinate clause “which Americans are able to admire because a pro-
tective sentimentality limits their understanding of it.”21 Baldwin’s defense of 
black English moves beyond the aesthetic in this moment. It is a matter of 
being, knowing, and home. Epistemology and ontology.
What, then, is the key to discerning the seriousness of the story of 
“the Negro in America” outside the sentimentality that distorts and makes 
African-American music and language digestible, common? That is, what is 
the sheer intelligence of vernacular? Baldwin’s claim here is simple: the link 
between memory, history, and language. The capacity of language to carry 
the past inside of its meaning in and as sound, negotiated in part by its link 
to the documentation of pain in the spirituals we find in Douglass, Du Bois, 
Locke, and others, folds intelligence into description, doubling the resonance 
of black English as at once sentimental and revolutionary. Baldwin writes:
The language forged by black people in this country, on this conti-
nent, as the choir just told you [my emphasis], got us from one place to 
another. We described the auction block. We described what it meant 
to be there. We survived what it meant to be torn from your mother, 
your father, your brother, your sister. We described it. We survived 
being described as mules, as having been put on earth only for the 
convenience of white people. We survived having nothing belonging 
to us, not your mother, not your father, not your daughter, not your 
son. And we created the only language in this country.22
The only language in this country. With that note, Baldwin roots the story 
of language in its orphaned moment, a moment in which the choir can 
tell—speaking with sheer intelligence—because sound functions as the 
element and embodiment of the transmission of memory, the moment of 
description that means everything for the present and future of language. 
History and memory here bear on the word, making the bass and treble 
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and tremolo of utterance, and thus give the word shape. So, when Baldwin 
writes that “language comes into existence by means of brutal necessity” 
and that “the rules of language are dictated by what the language must 
convey,” brutality and conveyance hinge on this moment of an orphaned 
birth. Sound as life itself.23
It is crucial to underscore, however, that Baldwin’s orphan narrative 
is no melancholic or abject story. He resists the apocalyptic and nostalgic 
tendencies of mid-century black Atlantic thought with a simple appeal to 
the vernacular of home. This phrase is important. In his appeal to ver-
nacular, Baldwin sees black English’s deep roots and how sound as site of 
memory of resistance and cultural formation builds history into speaking; 
there is no need for what Césaire calls “the end of the world” in Notebook 
or for Fanon’s declaration that he is not a prisoner of history in the conclu-
sion to Black Skin, White Masks. History is already enough for beginning 
again, in Baldwin’s view, precisely because the history of violence is already 
also a story of survival, resistance, pleasure, and world-making. Vernacular 
houses being. And that being cannot be reduced to alienation and abjection. 
Baldwin of course has plenty of outrage; his famous claim that every black 
man has a Bigger Thomas inside of him is plenty clear on that front. But, 
at the same time, Baldwin will always insist on a sense of home, both as 
a right and as its own sort of fact of blackness. In that insistence, Baldwin 
locates the question of language and being in a precarious, yet rooted sense 
of place and belonging as the vernacular of home, as home’s vernacular, 
and how being is sustained by speech itself. As the choir just told you, in the 
only language of this country. This quirky conception of language and being 
is what Marisa Parham describes in Haunting and Displacement as
living with a painful absence, with a phantom limb. Yet even if one 
might not be able to control one’s environment, cannot alone end 
racial violence, or steel against the news of other people’s deaths, 
there are indeed ways we seize tiny bits of control, make small spaces 
of balanced relation find some distance so that we might live with, as 
Karla Holloway puts it, “grace, hope, and resilience.”24
Grace, hope, and resilience give content to that much too broad and even 
quasi-abject term “survival.” To have passed on (evoking Holloway’s work) 
means both that death is at the center of cultural formation and that cul-
tural formation is not pathologically linked to death and its attendant 
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sufferings. Rather, the grace of passing on manifests in the sheer intel-
ligence of what comes out of testimony to the auction block. Testimony 
seizes control precisely when the loss of control is staged as the market 
and traffic in Black bodies. Neither melancholic nor mournful, Baldwin’s 
vision of black English as what is passed on in the mode of grace, hope, 
and resilience is that which has sustained and sustains life. Defense of ver-
nacularity is therefore at once a memory project (honoring what has come 
before) and laying claim to the roots African-Americans, even in the swirl 
of persecution and marginalization, have and insist upon in this place. A 
sense of belonging. A sense of speaking. A vernacular of home.
Perhaps ironically, or maybe just appropriately, Baldwin situates his 
encounter with this sense of language in the experience of exile. Reflecting 
on his time as a writer abroad, Baldwin steps away from the standard tropes 
of exile (alienation, loneliness, comparison, etc.) and recalls instead hearing 
black English for the first time from another space. In “On Language, Race, 
and the Black Writer,” he writes:
In order to deal with that reality [the reality of language as an enemy], 
I left the United States and went to France, where I was unable to 
speak to anybody because I spoke no French. I dropped into a silence 
in which I heard, for the first time, the beat of the language of the 
people who had produced me. For the first time, I was able to hear that 
music.25
Exile clears the space for Baldwin to hear. And while in this essay Baldwin 
reproduces one of the standard tropes of race and exile—that one under-
stands place from a distance, by way of contrast in feeling and senses of 
non-belonging—it is also important to note how intimately he links sound, 
music, language, and identity formation. The speechlessness of arriving in 
France without French language skills, along with the perspective on place 
afforded the exilic writer, opens Baldwin’s ears to the world-making force of 
vernacular language and culture. It is a question of production. Language, 
that house of being, produces a people. In producing a people and a way of 
being in sound and speech, vernacular makes a sense of home.
In one of the better-known passages from Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison 
reflects on the meaning of Louis Armstrong’s music. With this short reflec-
tion, Ellison, a life-long fan (and defender) of Satch’s music, moves from 
an appreciation of Armstrong as a musician and the question of voice to a 
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larger question of how we are to locate the meaning of African-American 
life, its expression, and the remarkable world that emerges from—or 
 perhaps as—a people of the margins. The reflection is at once epistemolog-
ical—a question of how Armstrong’s music is an expression of a form of 
knowledge and way of knowing—and ontological—a description of being 
in an anti-black racist world—and cannot therefore be reduced to a sort of 
“art from the ashes” model of suffering and its expression. Ellison locates 
knowing and being in the aesthetic expression of the-between-as-falling-
through, which is not some sort of interstitial or interval space in search 
of another place, but rather the breaks and cracks as such and in which 
African-American history and memory paradoxically sets roots, conceives 
space and place, and makes belonging and home. The breaks and cracks are 
intended, in an anti-black racist world, to be where a Black person falls in 
order to never be heard from again, to be rendered voiceless and therefore 
outside meaningful registers, and so, in the title of Ellison’s book, invisible. 
But Armstrong’s music makes sound from the cracks and as the invisible, 
an expression that knows and that is. Ellison writes:
There is a certain acoustical deadness in my hole, and when I have 
music I want to feel its vibration, not only with my ear but with my 
whole body. I’d like to hear five recordings of Louis Armstrong play-
ing and singing “What Did I Do to Be so Black and Blue”—all at the 
same time. . . . Perhaps I like Louis Armstrong because he’s made 
poetry out of being invisible. And my own grasp of invisibility aids 
me to understand his music. . . . Invisibility, let me explain, gives 
one a slightly different sense of time, you’re never quite on the beat. 
Sometimes you’re ahead and sometimes behind. Instead of the swift 
and imperceptible flowing of time, you are aware of its nodes, those 
points where time stands still or from which it leaps ahead. And you 
slip into the breaks and look around. That’s what you hear vaguely in 
Louis’ music.26
The language of African-American life is in these breaks and cracks. Born 
from the experience of not just being Black and blue, but also asking why this 
should be, African-American expressive culture, in Ellison’s short remark, 
demands that it be understood in this peculiar, enigmatic non-space between 
spaces. Understood on its own terms, that is, and so not measured by and in 
comparison to the (putatively) seamless and open space of white culture.
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I want to evoke Ellison here in order to return, by way of conclusion, 
to Baldwin’s remarks on the sorrow songs and sound. The relationship 
between Baldwin and Ellison, which always seems to involve that other 
great writer of the period, Richard Wright, is too much for this brief con-
cluding remark, but it is worth saying that Ellison’s remark puts in concise 
terms what Baldwin articulates across a long series of essays on the lan-
guage of vernacular culture. For Baldwin and Ellison, it is not enough to 
say that African-American language is a language worth valuing, or that it 
is pragmatically important in terms of pedagogy and cultural respect—the 
sorts of terms on which, say, the Ebonics “debate” of the early 1990s was 
premised. Those are altogether different questions. Baldwin, insofar as he 
moves away from straightforward political debate, deepens the account of 
language by seeing in vernacular speech the sound of memory and his-
tory, the knowing and being that comes from asking, in Armstrong’s famous 
song evoked by Ellison, “what did I do, to be so black and so blue?” Why 
has this come to pass?
What and why indeed.
The why of a language rooted in blackness and blueness captures so 
much in a single word. In asking why blackness makes a world blue, sur-
vival and resistance is built into the first word of vernacular language and 
cultural formation. To make that question into sound is to transform resis-
tance into the possibility of pleasure, both in the sense of the pleasure of 
sound (what could be more beautiful and pleasing than the sound of the 
choir’s telling or Satch’s trumpet and vocal?) and the pleasure of outwitting 
the enemy in his own language (the doubling of speech and signification). 
Sound and language slip into nodes, as Ellison puts it, and look around. 
And what is looking around, settled in a node or break, if not marking 
place as home? I am here and I see myself, I see you, even though you tried to 
keep me underground and lost in the breaks. The complication and complex-
ity here lies in conceiving home in a place so violently hostile, from the 
beginning, to the very idea of blackness. How can Baldwin posit the United 
States as home when the nation’s name names such terrifying space? What 
keeps him from the nostalgia for a civilizational past or messianic hope 
for a wholly new future—those signature gestures of Césaire and Fanon 
and their black Atlantic theory moment—in the face of such terror? The 
relation between language and being changes everything. If language is 
the house of being, and, as Baldwin argues, vernacular speech and cul-
ture welcomes and creates a people, then the terror of anti-black racism 
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reaches a certain limit. Racism’s reach is not total. Baldwin refuses to con-
cede to the abjection of blackness in language; if there is resistance to lan-
guage as another language altogether, then the scope of anti-black racism 
is limited by the cultural formation of Black people by Black people. Not by 
direct political struggle or conflict, but by the uncomplicated assertion and 
defense of difference. Language is how we inhabit the world; the defense 
of black English is a defense of a world and the right to inhabit it. It is, as 
Baldwin puts it, a matter of self-knowledge. To speak vernacular culture is to 
know both that you are and who you are. Language as knowledge and being. 
Language as a whole world.
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